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A COMPARISON OF LIQUIDATION REGIMES: 
DODD-FRANK’S ORDERLY LIQUIDATION 
AUTHORITY AND THE SECURITIES 
INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT 
Thomas W. Joo* 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)1 in response to the massive financial crisis of 
2008. The most dramatic manifestations of the crisis were the failures or 
near failures of large financial institutions, and the most dramatic policy 
choices facing the government concerned whether to bail out distressed 
institutions or allow them to fail. A vocal minority in Washington opposed 
any bailouts, and the public reaction to the bailouts that did occur was 
largely negative. 
Title II of Dodd-Frank, entitled “Orderly Liquidation Authority” (OLA) 
is designed to set out a procedure for regulators to address the specter of 
failure in the future. OLA, which resembles the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) bank-resolution authority in many respects, 
authorizes the appointment of the FDIC as a receiver to liquidate a failing 
financial company, but has no provisions for the rehabilitation of a failing 
company. This Article analyzes OLA in comparison to the resolution 
regime for securities broker-dealers,2 the Securities Investor Protection Act 
(SIPA). OLA and SIPA each take a class of failing financial institutions out 
of the bankruptcy regime and provide an alternate regime. SIPA established 
a not-for-profit corporation, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
(SIPC), to handle the liquidations of insolvent securities broker-dealers 
                                                                                                                                          
  * Professor, UC Davis School of Law. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law Symposium on Comparative 
Approaches to Systemic Risk and Resolution and at the West Coast Law and Society Retreat at 
Southwestern Law School, both in February 2011. I would like to thank all the participants at both 
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 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 2. The term “broker-dealer” is often used in securities-regulation discourse because securities 
regulation (including SIPA (Securities Investor Protection Act)) generally treats brokers and 
dealers the same. The securities laws define the terms “broker” and “dealer” as follows: “The term 
‘broker’ means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others” but does not include a bank. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2006). “The term ‘dealer’ 
means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for such person’s own 
account through a broker or otherwise” but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he 
“buys or sells securities for [his] . . . own account, either individually or in a fiduciary capacity, 
but not as a part of a regular business.” Id. § 78c(a)(5). The breadth of these definitions indicates 
the broad applicability of SIPA and the SIPC (Securities Investor Protection Corporation) 
membership requirement. See infra Part I.B. 
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under the oversight of a bankruptcy court. OLA makes a more radical 
departure from bankruptcy law by vesting considerable discretion in the 
Secretary of the Treasury (the Treasury Secretary), the President, the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the Fed), and the FDIC, which serves 
as receiver. Bankruptcy courts play no part in an OLA proceeding, and the 
judicial role is greatly reduced overall. 
It is no coincidence that both OLA and SIPA were quickly formulated 
and passed by Congress during periods of perceived economic crisis. 
Unfortunately, the causes of a major crisis are typically too complex to be 
dealt with, or even understood, during or immediately after the crisis. 
Political actors, however, need to portray themselves as doing something as 
a rapid and forceful response. 3  Taking time before acting might let 
government actors gather more information and craft more thoughtful 
responses, but it would also allow political momentum to dissipate. Both 
OLA and SIPA in many ways fulfilled short-term political goals more than 
long-term policy needs. During times perceived as “emergencies,” 
Congress’ typical response is to permit the executive branch to assume 
increased power.4 OLA, as a response to a particularly unsettling economic 
crisis, thus, goes much further in that direction than does SIPA. 
Bankruptcy is initiated by a debtor firm or its creditors. Under 
bankruptcy law, a firm’s creditors may force an insolvent firm into 
bankruptcy, and its estate may be liquidated under the direction of a trustee. 
But more commonly, a debtor firm remains in control and possession of its 
assets, subject to creditor input and court supervision, while it either winds 
down or attempts to reorganize and return to normal operation. Both SIPA 
and OLA, however, provide only for the seizure of a firm by a government 
or quasi-government agency, and its liquidation by that agency with 
significantly reduced input from creditors and courts. SIPA is, in many 
respects, a bankruptcy proceeding directed by a SIPC-appointed trustee, 
whereas OLA is a much more radical departure from bankruptcy. Neither 
statute contains provisions for the rehabilitation of a failing firm,5 which is 
one reason OLA has been criticized.6 Neither OLA nor SIPA, however, 
automatically imposes liquidation in all circumstances. As will be explained 
                                                                                                                                          
 3. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 531, 568–69 (2001). 
 4. See infra text accompanying note 92. 
 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a)(4); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(D), 124 Stat. 1461 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5390). 
 6. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 190–91 (2011). 
Others have argued in favor of a reorganization option for financial firms and even for banks. See, 
e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Chapter 11F: A Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to Resolve 
Financial Institutions, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 217 (Kenneth E. 
Scott, George P. Schultz & John B. Taylor eds., 2009); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance 
of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, 
Bank and Insurance Insolvency]. 
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below, each statute gives regulators and politicians discretion as to whether 
to pursue liquidation. Neither statute prohibits alternative responses, such as 
bankruptcy proceedings, or bailouts by the Fed or Congress, all of which 
were employed in 2008. 
I. SIPA 
SIPA was passed in 1970 in response to a wave of brokerage-firm 
failures. It provides for orderly liquidation of an insolvent brokerage firm 
under the oversight of SIPC, a government-chartered, non-profit private 
corporation. At the time (and still today), brokerages were excluded from 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and Chapter 7 already contained 
provisions for the liquidation of insolvent brokerage firms. SIPA added two 
significant innovations: first, it authorized SIPC to petition a court for the 
liquidation of a brokerage firm; and second, it established an industry-
funded insurance fund, administered by SIPC, to protect the contents of 
customers’ accounts when the debtor firm’s assets are insufficient to do so. 
A. PURPOSES OF SIPA 
Just as FDIC insurance was intended to reassure the retail bank 
depositor, the stated purpose of SIPA is to bolster “investor confidence” in 
the securities markets,7 and it does so by focusing (at least in principle) on 
protecting a specific class of a failed brokerage firm’s creditors: its 
customers. SIPA’s choice to insure customers is not necessarily optimal 
from an efficiency standpoint. It can reduce customers’ incentive to seek 
out less risky brokerages. 8  Moreover, because SIPA insures all broker-
dealers without regard to the level of their risk of failure, it reduces firms’ 
incentives to control risk.9 But in any event, SIPA is consistent with U.S. 
securities regulation, which has historically focused on encouraging 
“investor confidence” even when market conditions would justify caution.10 
Ironically, the immediate impetus for SIPA’s passage in 1970 was a 
rash of brokerage failures that were not caused by a lack of customer 
confidence in brokers. Rather, the string of failures was caused by the “one-
two punch” of a “back-office crisis” and a subsequent stock-market 
slump.11 A bubble market in the late 1960s resulted in trading volume so 
high that, in those pre-computer days, the trade-processing capacity of 
                                                                                                                                          
 7. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1080–81 (1999). 
 8. See id. at 1130–31. Given customers’ relative inability to investigate brokers’ financial 
health, however, this effect is probably not that significant. See id. 
 9. See id. at 1133. 
 10. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor 
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1143–44 
(2003).  
 11. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 450–51 (rev. ed. 1995). 
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firms’ “back offices” was overloaded.12 This resulted in bookkeeping errors, 
the loss of securities and cash, and in some cases, fraud and theft.13 Some 
firms were thus “forced out of business by having too much business.”14 
Other firms exploited the stock bubble by engaging in various kinds of 
fraud that eventually contributed to their failures.15 All of these failures 
could be said to have been caused by customers’ overconfidence in brokers’ 
technical capability and honesty. Just as the brokerage industry invested 
heavily in automation and other ways to expand processing capacity, the 
stock-market bubble burst in 1969, causing even more firms to fail. As in 
the first stage of the crisis, lack of confidence in brokers was not the 
problem. Rather, this second wave of failures was caused by a justified lack 
of confidence in the investment value of securities.16 
The legislative history of SIPA evinces little concern for the brokerage 
industry itself; rather, it was intended to restore “investor confidence” in 
securities markets, thereby increasing investment and lifting the market out 
of its slump. 17  Note that the protected customers under SIPA are not 
investors in the failed firm; instead, they are creditors of the firm who use 
the firm as a middleman to invest in securities markets. Moreover, SIPA’s 
main function is to preserve the contents of customer trading accounts; it 
does not protect investors against declines in the market value of securities 
(the apparent cause of the second wave of brokerage failures). 
Although SIPA does not contain provisions for the rescue or 
rehabilitation of a failing brokerage firm, it operates as a subsidy of the 
brokerage industry in that it encourages patronage of the industry by 
reducing customer risk. Congress seems to have chosen the brokerage 
industry as an incidental beneficiary of the established government 
principle of protecting and supporting the securities markets. While SIPC is 
funded primarily by assessments on the industry itself, SIPA gives 
brokerage customers insurance coverage that the market did not provide at 
the time and likely would not have. Furthermore, the SIPA scheme receives 
taxpayer support in a number of ways: SIPC can borrow from the Treasury; 
it is tax-exempt; the rates it charges for insurance may be lower than the 
market would charge; and it is overseen by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and Congress.18 Although SIPA does not “bail out” any 
particular failing firm, it was designed to alleviate financial distress in the 
brokerage industry and prevent further failures of brokers. Cheryl Block has 
                                                                                                                                          
 12. Id. at 450–51.  
 13. Id. at 451.  
 14. Id. (quoting SEC Chairman Hamer Budge).  
 15. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1083–84. 
 16. For more detail on the crisis, see SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 451–52; Joo, supra note 7, 
at 1076–80. 
 17. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1080–81. 
 18. See id. at 1098–99, 1114–15. 
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referred to this kind of industry-wide government assistance as a 
“prospective” “industry bailout.”19 
B. INITIATING A SIPA LIQUIDATION 
With few exceptions, every registered broker or dealer of securities 
must be a SIPC member.20 SIPC may apply to a federal district court for a 
protective decree if SIPC determines that a member firm has failed or is in 
danger of failing to meet its obligations to its customers, and if the firm 
meets one of the following four conditions: it is insolvent; it is subject to a 
proceeding in which a receiver, trustee, or liquidator has been appointed; it 
is out of compliance with the rules of the SEC or self-regulatory 
organizations (SRO) regarding financial responsibility or hypothecation of 
customer securities; 21  or it is unable to establish compliance with such 
rules.22 Individual creditors have no standing to initiate a SIPA proceeding 
or to compel SIPC to do so.23 
Judicial review of a SIPC petition is limited. If the district court finds 
that the firm meets certain enumerated criteria indicating financial distress, 
it “shall forthwith issue a protective decree.”24 The court must then appoint 
a trustee and an attorney for the trustee, both of whom are selected by SIPC 
“in its sole discretion.”25 The court then must remove the proceeding to the 
bankruptcy court of that district.26 SIPC may not give financial assistance to 
a debtor firm or take any steps to rehabilitate it. SIPA usually appoints a 
trustee from the private sector who has extensive experience in the 
securities industry. 27  The trustees have often performed previous 
liquidations, and are supported by SIPC’s experienced and highly 
specialized staff. Once the petition has been granted, the district court must 
transfer the proceeding to bankruptcy court, which retains jurisdiction over 
the remainder of the liquidation.28 
                                                                                                                                          
 19. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 
IND. L.J. 951, 973, 976 (1992); Joo, supra note 7, at 1106 (“Thus, in Professor Block’s analysis, it 
was a prospective bailout of each member firm and of the industry generally.”). 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 21. Hypothecation refers to the collateral a customer must pledge to secure purchases of 
securities made on margin (i.e., with loans from the broker). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (3d 
ed. 2006).  
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)(A), (b)(1). 
 23. See SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 425 (1975). 
 24. Specifically, the court must issue the decree if it finds that the firm is subject to a 
proceeding in which a receiver, trustee, or liquidator has been appointed; is out of compliance 
with SEC or SRO rules for financial responsibility or hypothecation of customer securities; or is 
unable to establish compliance with such rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(1)(B), (C), (D). 
 25. Id. § 78eee(b)(3). The appointment is, however, subject to a hearing with respect to the 
disinterestedness of the trustee. Id. § 78eee(b)(6)(B).  
 26. Id. § 78eee(b)(4).  
 27. Joo, supra note 7, at 1117. A SIPA employee may serve as the trustee for a smaller 
liquidation. Id. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4). 
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Although the decision whether to petition for liquidation is technically 
up to SIPC, SIPC is in fact influenced by other government actors in 
determining whether a liquidation occurs. For example, SIPC does not have 
any power or authority to monitor its members for signs of distress, and 
thus, it cannot as a practical matter proactively initiate a liquidation.29 The 
SEC and the SROs, however, do have the ability to monitor broker-dealers, 
so the initiation of a SIPC liquidation effectively requires a request from the 
SEC or an SRO. 30  In addition, the executive branch has significant 
influence over whether a SIPA liquidation occurs, and the White House 
also has political leverage over SIPC itself. Of SIPC’s seven board 
members, who each serve three-year terms, 31  five are presidential 
appointees, the sixth is appointed by the Treasury Secretary (from among 
the Treasury’s employees), and the seventh is appointed by the Fed (from 
among the Fed’s employees).32 
SIPA establishes liquidation authority and only liquidation authority, 
and most brokerage failures are administered under SIPA. But no provision 
of SIPA requires a failing brokerage to be liquidated under SIPA. SIPA 
does not prevent the SEC, an SRO, or a distressed firm from requesting 
special assistance from the Treasury, Congress, the White House, or the 
Fed. Indeed, the executive branch regularly claims and exercises 
extraordinary powers when it perceives an “emergency,” and Congress 
tends to go along.33 Thus, SIPA has not always been invoked with respect 
to brokers that were considered “too big to fail.” For example, when Bear 
Stearns was in danger of failing in 2008, it did not go into liquidation under 
SIPA or the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the Fed engineered a soft landing 
for Bear Stearns by helping finance its purchase by JPMorgan.34 
In other cases, firms that were not rescued by the government went into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, despite the fact that the Bankruptcy Code nominally 
excludes securities brokers and dealers from Chapter 11 and requires them 
to liquidate under special Chapter 7 provisions or SIPA. The two largest 
broker-dealers to go bankrupt—Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 and 
Lehman Brothers (Lehman) in 2008—evaded the exclusion by employing 
“roughly the same strategy”: their holding companies filed for Chapter 11 
                                                                                                                                          
 29. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1097–98. 
 30. According to SIPA, if the SEC or an SRO “is aware of facts which lead it to believe that 
any broker or dealer subject to its regulation is in or is approaching financial difficulty, it shall 
immediately notify SIPC.” 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(1). But neither the SEC nor SRO is under any 
affirmative duty to actively monitor brokerages for signs of financial distress. Indeed, an SRO that 
fails in good faith to report the financial distress of one of its members is immune from liability. 
Id. § 78iii(b). 
 31. See id. § 78ccc(c)(4). 
 32. Id. § 78ccc(c)(2). 
 33. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1649 (2009). 
 34. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
1, 12 (2009) [hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy]. 
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but their brokerage subsidiaries did not file for bankruptcy until after 
transferring their customer accounts. 35  In Lehman’s case, this involved 
some questionable manipulation of statutory procedures.36 Thus, although 
Lehman’s parent holding company, like Drexel, is being liquidated, it is 
doing so as a debtor-in-possession (DIP) under Chapter 11 rather than under 
the direction of a Chapter 7 or SIPA trustee.37 
The prevalence of “too big to fail” ideology on Wall Street is evidenced 
by the fact that Lehman’s descent into bankruptcy and SIPA proceedings— 
the ostensibly “normal” statutory regimes for the failure of financial 
firms—were met with far more surprise than the ad hoc intervention to 
mitigate Bear Stearns’s failure, or subsequent bailout maneuvers such as the 
opening of the Fed’s discount window to investment banks and the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which established 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).38 
C. SIPA LIQUIDATION, INSURANCE, AND THE SIPC FUND 
In most technical respects, a SIPA liquidation resembles a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy liquidation.39 But it differs significantly from a bankruptcy in 
                                                                                                                                          
 35. See id. at 4.  
 36. Lehman Brothers Inc., Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary, was not included in the holding 
company’s Chapter 11 filing and is now being liquidated under SIPA. As David Skeel explains, 
the main purpose of the holding company’s bankruptcy was to quickly sell the business of its 
brokerage subsidiary (to Barclays) before it lost value. Id. The subsidiary was not part of the 
holding company’s Chapter 11 estate, however, and could not be because of the brokerage 
exclusion; thus, the judge overseeing the Chapter 11 case had no power to approve the sale. Id. At 
the request of Lehman’s lawyers, SIPC initiated a SIPA liquidation of the brokerage 
simultaneously with the bankruptcy court hearing on its sale to Barclays, arguably giving the 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to approve the sale. Id. at 4–5. See also Ben Hallman, A Moment’s 
Notice, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL 
.jsp?id=1202514540922&slreturn=1; Credit FAQ: How is the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
Bankruptcy Progressing?, STANDARD & POOR’S 1, 6–7 (2008), available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Lehman_Bros_Bankruptcy.pdf. According to 
Skeel, some parties at the hearing unsuccessfully objected on the (apparently correct) ground that 
the brokerage business was never part of the Chapter 11 debtor’s estate. See Skeel, Bankruptcy, 
supra note 34, at 5. 
 37. See Skeel, Bankruptcy, supra note 34, at 4.  
 38. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 39. Chapter 7 has special provisions for the liquidation of securities brokers (the Bankruptcy 
Code does not permit them to reorganize under Chapter 11), and SIPA closely resembles this 
procedure. The key differences are the role of SIPC and the SIPC Fund. In addition, SIPA requires 
SIPA trustees to satisfy customers’ claims for securities with securities to the extent possible 
(even if this requires using the fund of customer property or SIPC funds to purchase securities). 
See Joo, supra note 7, at 1112 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(d) (2006)). Under Chapter 7, by 
contrast, the estate must be liquidated, and customers must be paid pro rata in cash. See Kimberley 
Anne Summe, Lessons Learned from the Lehman Bankruptcy, in ENDING GOVERNMENT 
BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 59, 67 (Kenneth E. Scott, George P. Schultz & John B. Taylor 
eds., 2009); 11 U.S.C. § 748 (2006) (requiring Chapter 7 trustee to reduce all securities to money); 
id. § 752 (requiring trustee to distribute customer property ratably). Most broker liquidations are 
administered by SIPC under SIPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b). 
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that SIPA singles out one type of creditor claim for special treatment: 
customers’ claims for the securities and cash in their accounts.40 To this 
end, SIPA provides customers (but not other creditors) with insurance. 
Roughly analogous to FDIC deposit insurance, SIPC insurance guarantees 
the return of the contents of customer accounts up to certain dollar-value 
limits. Another key distinguishing feature is the SIPC Fund, which is 
amassed and maintained from regular assessments on broker-dealers. The 
SIPC Fund covers insurance payments to customers, as well as all of 
SIPC’s other costs,41 including the administrative costs of a liquidation to 
the extent that the debtor firm’s assets are insufficient to do so. 
SIPC’s statutorily authorized assessments on its member firms have 
historically been nominal, flat amounts, but SIPA authorizes SIPC to make 
such assessments as “SIPC may deem necessary and appropriate to 
establish and maintain the fund and to repay any borrowings by SIPC.”42 
After the immense payouts to the former customers of Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities LLC, SIPC increased assessments on its members in 
order to restore the size of the SIPC Fund. 43  Formerly a trivial $150 
annually, assessments were raised to 0.25 percent of net operating 
revenue.44 The chief executive officer of one moderately-sized firm with 
300 representatives and $25 million in gross revenue estimated that his 
firm’s assessment would rise to $44,000 per year.45 Note that these new 
assessments are based on firm size and not on firm-specific risk factors. 
SIPC is statutorily authorized to make risk-based assessments,46 but it has 
never done so. SIPC’s chairman has stated that the required actuarial work 
would be too difficult and costly.47 
A SIPA liquidation divides the debtor’s estate into three parts.48 First, 
securities that are registered and held in the name of the customer are 
                                                                                                                                          
 40. This intended favoritism notwithstanding, customer protection is less than perfect. See Joo, 
supra note 7, at 1121–26; SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF AUDITS, No. 495, 
SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF THE SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP.’S ACTIVITIES 12–13 (2011) (highlighting 
the need for increased monitoring of SIPC’s activities by the SEC) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON 
SIPC].  
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(a)(1) (stating that “all expenditures made by SIPC shall be made 
out of the fund”). 
 42. See id. § 78ddd(c)(2). The statutory minimum assessment had long been $150. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78ddd(d)(1)(C); Dan Jamieson, B-Ds Reel from Higher SIPC Fees, INV. NEWS (Aug. 9, 
2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090809/REG/308099981. Dodd-Frank amended 
this to state that the statutory minimum may be up to 0.02 percent of a member firm’s gross 
revenues from the securities business. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929V(a), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1868 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(d)(1)(C) (2010)).  
 43. See Jamieson, supra note 42.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c)(2). 
 47. See Jamieson, supra note 42.  
 48. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1095–96. 
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referred to as “customer name securities.” 49  These are returned to the 
customer outright. Second, the securities and cash held by the debtor for the 
accounts of investors make up the “fund of customer property.”50 This is 
typically the bulk of a SIPA debtor’s estate. In theory, broker-dealers must 
maintain sufficient liquidity to satisfy all customers’ claims for their 
property, as required by broker-dealer regulations. But a distressed firm’s 
fund of customer property often falls short due to inadvertent or intentional 
regulatory violations, volatile financial instruments, or deliberate 
misappropriation. 51  Third, the debtor’s remaining assets make up the 
general estate, which is treated essentially like a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
estate.52 
In practice, the first category—customer name securities—is relatively 
unimportant because securities in a brokerage account are rarely registered 
in the customer’s name. 53  Customers’ claims for the contents of their 
accounts are satisfied, to the extent possible, out of the fund of customer 
property. SIPC insurance is designed to protect the contents of a brokerage 
customer’s account against shortfalls in the fund of customer property. This 
insurance coverage is limited to $500,000 per customer, of which a 
maximum of $250,000 may be for cash. SIPC insurance is limited to 
satisfying “claims for customer property”—that is, claims for the contents 
of customer accounts as indicated by the debtor firm’s records as of the date 
of filing. SIPC does not provide any coverage for other losses to customers, 
such as those due to declines in the market value of securities, the broker’s 
failure to execute customer orders, or the broker’s fraudulent inducement of 
the customer’s purchase of securities.54 The SIPC trustee decides whether a 
claim for customer property has been established to his or her satisfaction, 
and if so, the court “shall” authorize its payment.55 A customer who objects 
to the trustee’s determination of his or her claim, however, may file a 
formal claim with the bankruptcy court.56 
All unsecured creditor claims other than “claims for customer property” 
(including the customer claims just noted, or customer claims that exceed 
                                                                                                                                          
 49. Id. at 1095.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 1087–91, 1098–1103. 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (2006); accord 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 53. In order to enhance transferability, customer name securities are more typically held in 
“street name” (i.e., in the name of the broker or an intermediary). That is, a security (or cash) in 
the “fund of customer property” is, like money in a bank, not normally the “property” of any 
particular customer, but rather, part of the resources out of which an institution satisfies its 
customers’ contractual claims. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1095. 
 54. Under SIPA, customer claims for securities are to be satisfied with those securities, not 
with cash equivalents. Thus, the statute requires that the trustee, “to the extent that securities can 
be purchased in a fair and orderly market, purchase securities as necessary for the delivery of 
securities to customers in satisfaction of their claims.” 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(d). 
 55. Id. § 78fff-2(b).  
 56. See id. 
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the limits of SIPC insurance coverage) are heard by the court like unsecured 
claims in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The claims are satisfied from the general 
estate in accordance with the priority of claims under Chapter 7.57 Among 
unsecured claims against the general estate, SIPC’s costs of administering a 
liquidation have the highest priority.58 These administrative costs include 
those that benefit only customer-creditors, such as the processing of 
customer claims (which often includes litigation), transferring securities and 
cash to customers (which may include the purchase of securities for 
customers, as described above), and closing out open securities 
transactions.59 The allocation of these administrative costs to the general 
estate abridges the normal approach to allocating administrative expenses in 
bankruptcy, under which the costs of administrative tasks are allocated to 
those creditors who benefit from them.60 
The costs of administering a SIPC liquidation can be steep, and can 
deplete the general estate to the detriment of other general creditor claims.61 
The SEC and courts have expressed concern about SIPC’s high 
administrative costs, in particular the fees it pays to trustees.62 Due to the 
complex financial issues involved in a brokerage liquidation, trustees and 
the law firms they retain tend to be very highly paid Wall Street 
professionals. Unlike trustee fees in bankruptcy, SIPA trustee fees are not 
subject to statutory caps and are subject to only limited judicial review.63 If 
the general estate is insufficient to cover administrative expenses, those 
expenses are, like SIPC insurance, paid for out of the SIPC Fund. If the 
SIPC Fund is insufficient to satisfy administrative costs or insurance claims, 
SIPC may borrow from the SEC, which may in turn borrow from the 
Treasury.64 
II. OLA 
OLA gives the government broad authority to seek the liquidation of 
“financial companies,” very broadly defined,65 under the auspices of the 
                                                                                                                                          
 57. See 11 U.S.C. § 726; 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d); accord 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(e).  
 59. See id. 
 60. See Joo, supra note 7, at 1117–21. 
 61. See id. at 1117. 
 62. See SEC REPORT ON SIPC, supra note 40, at 11–12, 17–21. 
 63. See id. at 18–19. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(g), (h) (2006). 
 65. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 201(a)(11)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1443 (2010) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381 (2010)) (providing that a company must be chartered in the United 
States and be a bank holding company, or be engaged in activities that the Fed determines are 
financial in nature in accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006)). “Financial companies” include 
any U.S.-chartered bank holding company as well as any U.S.-chartered nonbank company that 
derives 85 percent or more of its revenue from activities that the Fed defines as financial in nature 
pursuant to § 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), (n)(2) (defining 
financial activity under § 1843(k)). 
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FDIC. As will be explained further below, such a liquidation would differ 
from a SIPA liquidation in some critical ways. OLA has no insurance 
component, amasses no fund, and imposes no ex ante assessments on firms. 
More fundamentally, SIPA is the standard response to broker-dealer 
insolvency, but in practice has not applied to extraordinary failures (i.e., 
Drexel and Lehman). In contrast, OLA is intended to apply only in 
extraordinary circumstances. Those circumstances, however, are undefined 
by the statute and left largely up to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary 
and the President. 
Broad discretion afforded to regulators and the executive branch is a 
hallmark of OLA. Although nominally reserved for failing firms whose 
resolution by other means would pose a “systemic risk,” 66 that term is 
undefined, and the statute provides for only minimal judicial review of the 
decision to seek liquidation. Moreover, the actions of the FDIC in an OLA 
liquidation would be subject to far less judicial review than those of a SIPC 
trustee in a SIPA liquidation. 
A. PURPOSES OF OLA 
The stated purposes of OLA differ from those of SIPA. While SIPA’s 
customer-protection goal may be susceptible to criticism, it is consistent 
with the orthodox approach to securities regulation. Moreover, SIPA’s 
primary goal of customer protection is relatively clear and narrowly 
defined, and the Act is narrowly tailored to pursue that goal. The stated 
goals of Dodd-Frank, however, are vague and conflicting. In contrast to 
SIPA, OLA does not present itself as a measure to restore investor 
confidence in the securities markets. Rather, it presents itself as a means of 
protecting the economy from the depredations of the financial industry, and 
from future bailouts of the industry. This rhetoric is much more 
aggressively populist. While SIPA sought to encourage the rank-and-file 
investor to participate in capital markets, OLA appeals to Main Street’s 
resentment of Wall Street. It does so, however, in broad and vague terms. 
The preamble to Dodd-Frank describes it as an act: 
To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to 
fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.67 
                                                                                                                                          
 66. Section 203, entitled “Systemic Risk Determination,” states that a firm should be resolved 
under OLA if the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the president, finds that “the failure of 
the financial company and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law would 
have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” Dodd-Frank Act  
§ 203(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1451 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383). 
 67. Id. pmbl. 
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In addition to the Dodd-Frank preamble, OLA has its own statement of 
purpose. OLA states that the general purpose of its liquidation authority is a 
moderately conservative one: to mitigate “significant risk to the financial 
stability of the United States”68—that is, to protect the status quo. But it 
also reflects a desire to punish those seen as responsible for financial 
failure—something the 2008 bailouts are perceived as having failed to do. 
OLA states that it is meant to “minimize[] moral hazard,” insure that 
“creditors and shareholders will bear the losses,” remove “management 
responsible for the [failure],” and make those managers “bear losses 
consistent with their responsibility, including actions for damages, 
restitution, and recoupment of compensation and other gains.” 69  The 
removal of responsible management and assignment of blame may be 
justifiable on moral, political, and economic grounds, but would surely be 
only a small part, in dollar terms, of a major liquidation. Indeed, despite 
their pride of place in OLA’s statement of purpose, these issues are covered 
by a few short subsections of OLA’s eighty pages. 70  Moreover, these 
symbolic but relatively small steps toward “accountability” of management 
are also of less systemic significance than the treatment of creditors. As will 
be discussed below, OLA’s general admonition to allocate losses to 
creditors would be subject to considerable agency discretion during the 
course of a liquidation. OLA’s concern for “financial stability” is, of course, 
a legitimate concern, but it may cut against the notion of accountability by 
justifying the subsidization of major creditors that implicate systemic 
stability. 
B. INITIATING AN OLA LIQUIDATION 
The first step toward an OLA liquidation is a recommendation to the 
Treasury Secretary. The agencies charged with making such a 
recommendation differ according to the type of firm in distress. For 
financial companies in general, the FDIC’s board of directors and the Fed 
may make a recommendation by a two-thirds vote of both boards.71 If the 
financial company or its largest subsidiary were a broker-dealer, the SEC 
and the Fed could make the recommendation by a two-thirds vote of both.72 
                                                                                                                                          
 68. Id. § 204(a). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. § 206(4), (5) (removal of officers and directors); id. § 204(a)(3) (clawback of 
compensation awarded to parties responsible for the failure). 
 71. Id. § 203(a)(1)(A). 
 72. Id. § 203(a)(1)(B). Although the language of the statute is unclear, it appears that the FDIC 
would not have concurrent authority to make recommendations if a financial company (or its 
largest subsidiary) were a broker-dealer. If the distressed firm were an insurance company, a 
recommendation of liquidation could be made by the director of the Federal Insurance Office (an 
agency newly created by Dodd-Frank) and a two-thirds vote of the Fed’s Board of Governors. Id. 
§ 203(a)(1)(C). A distressed insurance company, however, would be liquidated under applicable 
state law, not OLA. Id. § 203(e). 
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The Treasury Secretary could also initiate the process by asking the relevant 
agencies to consider making such a recommendation. OLA requires the 
agency recommendation to state its reasons in some detail, including a 
description of the effect the firm’s failure would have on stability and why 
market solutions and conventional bankruptcy would be inappropriate.73 
Upon receiving the recommendation, the Treasury Secretary is to 
confer with the president and decide whether to petition the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia for appointment of the FDIC as receiver. 
The Treasury Secretary and President are to base their decision on their 
assessment of whether the firm is in default or in danger of default,74 as well 
as a number of even more vague and subjective factors. These include the 
absence of a “viable private sector alternative . . . to prevent the default”; 
whether the firm’s failure “would have serious adverse effects on financial 
stability in the United States” if it were to proceed under bankruptcy or 
other relevant law;75 whether the effects of an OLA proceeding on third 
parties would be “appropriate” in light of a proceeding’s positive effects on 
financial stability; the cost to the public; and the potential for moral 
hazard.76 Thus, it is difficult to state in advance for any particular firm 
whether the firm’s failure would trigger an OLA proceeding. As noted 
above, regulators intervened in 2008 to prevent some distressed 
institutions—but not others—from entering bankruptcy and/or SIPA 
proceedings. Regulators were criticized for approaching the choice with 
                                                                                                                                          
 73. Specifically, Title II requires the recommendation to include: 
(A) an evaluation of whether the financial company is in default or in danger of default;  
(B) a description of the effect that the default of the financial company would have on 
financial stability in the United States; 
(C) a description of the effect that the default of the financial company would have on 
economic conditions or financial stability for low income, minority, or underserved 
communities; 
(D) a recommendation regarding the nature and the extent of actions to be taken under 
this title regarding the financial company; 
(E) an evaluation of the likelihood of a private sector alternative to prevent the default 
of the financial company; 
(F) an evaluation of why a case under the Bankruptcy Code is not appropriate for the 
financial company; 
(G) an evaluation of the effects on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders of the 
financial company and other market participants; and 
(H) an evaluation of whether the company satisfies the definition of a financial 
company under section 201. 
Id. § 203(a)(2). 
 74. Id. § 203(b)(1).  
 75. Id. § 203(b)(2)–(5). 
 76. See id. § 203(b)(4), (5). 
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respect to each institution in an ad hoc manner that was neither fair nor in 
the best interests of systemic stability. OLA does nothing to solve that 
problem; to be fair, however, it is unclear how it could have done so. 
On the one hand, OLA requires consultation among multiple 
government actors before a liquidation may proceed.77 The initial agency 
recommendation requires a two-thirds vote by both the agency and the Fed. 
Furthermore, the Treasury Secretary and President must concur and justify 
their positions with particular findings. On the other hand, the decision to 
pursue liquidation involves little input from the judiciary and none from 
Congress. The statute allows for only minimal judicial review of a petition, 
and key criteria (e.g., “systemic risk” and “serious adverse effects on 
financial stability”) are undefined. 
The scope of the district court’s review is very limited. Although, as 
noted above, OLA requires the initial agency recommendation to provide 
further detailed justifications, the statute does not provide for judicial 
review of these reasons (or even of whether they were made). The court is 
to review, under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard, 
only the Treasury Secretary’s determination that the financial company is in 
default or in danger of default, and that it satisfies the statutory definition of 
a financial company.78 If these two determinations are not arbitrary and 
capricious, the court must issue an order authorizing the Treasury Secretary 
to appoint the FDIC as receiver. This judicial review is far more deferential 
than the review of a SIPC liquidation petition, described in the previous 
section.79 Furthermore, the district court has only twenty-four hours from 
the time of filing to hold a hearing and decide whether to grant the Treasury 
Secretary’s petition. If the court does not render a decision within twenty-
four hours of the petition, the petition will be automatically granted.80 Thus, 
whether to pursue liquidation is largely left to executive discretion. 
OLA has been criticized on the ground that liquidation is a more 
appropriate solution to a relatively isolated firm failure than to a failure that 
is part of a systemic crisis. 81  But OLA itself does not require the 
government to liquidate a failing firm. It only empowers the government to 
initiate a liquidation. What OLA really does is prescribe FDIC powers and 
procedures if the government decides to liquidate a company. That decision 
                                                                                                                                          
 77. Indeed, one important source of business law commentary concludes that “[g]iven the 
many conditions that must be satisfied . . . the Act is weighted against the appointment of the 
FDIC as receiver of a financial company.” Summary of the Dodd-Frank Act: Resolution of Failing 
Financial Institutions, PRAC. L. CO., http://us.practicallaw.com/2-502-8818?q=2-502-8818 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2011).  
 78. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv), 124 Stat. 1445 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382). 
 79. But of course SIPA liquidations are not entirely free from political influence. See supra 
text accompanying notes 30–34 (discussing the SEC’s role in SIPA liquidations and the 
presidential appointment of the SIPC board). 
 80. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), 124 Stat. 1445 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382). 
 81. Gordon & Muller, supra note 6, at 194–95. 
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is primarily up to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary (in consultation 
with the President who appointed him or her). If the Treasury Secretary 
were to decide that a troubled institution should be liquidated, he or she 
could appoint the FDIC as liquidation receiver, subject to only minimal 
judicial review. In such case, OLA would govern the FDIC’s liquidation. 
But if the Treasury Secretary did not want a company to be liquidated, he or 
she could simply choose not to file a petition. 
The existence of liquidation authority will not necessarily result in its 
use. Neither SIPA nor OLA poses any situation in which receivership and 
liquidation would be required and rescue would be prohibited. A report 
prepared for the American Bankers Association argues that OLA creates 
confusion because major financial firms “and their equity holders, creditors, 
borrowers, customers, vendors and counterparties” will be unable to predict 
“whether financial distress at the company will be dealt with in a Chapter 
11 reorganization or a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code, or 
a Federal receivership under Title II [i.e., OLA].”82 
While OLA does not authorize any legislative bailouts, it does not 
prohibit any in the future (indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such a 
prohibition could be enacted, short of a constitutional amendment). Outside 
of OLA, Dodd-Frank places some nominal limits on government powers—
specifically, on the powers the Fed may exercise in an emergency. Section 
1101 of Dodd-Frank amends § 13 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C.  
§ 343) to place some limits on the Fed’s emergency lending authority. For 
example, the Fed formerly had broad authority to authorize a member bank 
to make discounted loans to “any individual, partnership, or corporation.”83 
Under the revised law, the Fed may only authorize such loans in the context 
of a “broad-based” program;84 such a program may not be “established for 
the purpose of assisting a single and specific company avoid bankruptcy [or 
OLA or any other insolvency proceeding].”85 Nor may the Fed authorize 
such loans to firms in bankruptcy or OLA. Furthermore, the Fed must 
report on such loans to Congress. In addition, the amended § 13 directs the 
Fed to pass regulations that “require that a Federal reserve bank assign, 
consistent with sound risk management practices and to ensure protection 
for the taxpayer, a lendable value to all collateral for a loan executed by a 
Federal reserve bank.”86 
It has been argued that these restrictions on Fed authority will severely 
limit governmental authority to respond to a crisis, such that liquidation 
                                                                                                                                          
 82. Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig & David L. Ansell, Title II: Orderly Liquidation 
Authority, AM. BANKERS ASS’N (2011), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/RegReform/TitleII 
Summary.pdf. 
 83. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. § 1101(a)(6).  
 86. Id.  
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under OLA will become the only available avenue for massive 
intervention.87 This overstates the significance of these amendments. As 
noted above, OLA does not prohibit legislative bailouts. Moreover, § 13’s 
new limits on the Fed seem to leave significant wiggle room. The 
restrictions on “broad-based” programs are not terribly restrictive: they 
could be satisfied, for example, by any program established to help at least 
two firms avoid bankruptcy. Indeed, OLA’s central premise—that certain 
firms have systemic importance—holds that one firm’s collapse could 
trigger multiple failures; thus, it could easily be argued that even an action 
whose immediate effect was to save one firm was “established for the 
purpose” of helping multiple firms avoid failure. One of the most visible of 
the Fed’s responses to the crisis in 2008—opening the discount window to 
investment banks—was intended to help a small number of major firms, but 
would have satisfied OLA’s definition of a “broad-based” program. 
Moreover, even with respect to aiding a single, specific firm, the 
amended § 13 seems to restrict only assistance that is meant to “avoid 
bankruptcy” or other insolvency proceeding. It would, of course, be easy to 
defend assistance to a single firm on the ground that it was not meant to 
help the firm avoid bankruptcy because bankruptcy was not inevitable, that 
assistance to a single firm would help multiple firms avoid bankruptcy, or 
that the Fed’s actual intent was something other than avoiding bankruptcy 
(such as protecting “financial stability”). 88  Section 13’s collateral 
requirement could conceivably limit the Fed’s lending ability, but note that 
the statute only instructs the Fed to pass rules requiring collateral.89 Like 
much financial regulation, the statute’s actual effect depends on the content 
of the rules, but the statute itself gives little guidance as to that content. 
Obviously, the Fed has no incentive to pass a very strict rule. 
Finally, even to the extent that the amendments do place limits on the 
Fed, it is unclear whether or how such limits could be enforced. The courts 
have thus far not allowed either private plaintiffs or members of Congress 
to sue to enforce legal restrictions on the powers of the Fed.90 Furthermore, 
§ 13, by its terms, applies only to the Fed’s publicly-appointed Board of 
Governors and not to the individual regional Federal Reserve Banks (most 
notably the New York Fed), which are privately-owned entities with their 
own boards of directors.91 
                                                                                                                                          
 87. Gordon & Muller, supra note 6, at 192–93, 196–97. 
 88. Section 13 would also have no effect on other kinds of assistance from the Fed, such as the 
DIP financing reportedly provided to facilitate (not avoid) Lehman’s liquidation in Chapter 11. 
See Lehman Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, THE STREET (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10437261/lehman-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy.html. 
 89. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101, 124 Stat. 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)).  
 90. See Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: Mobility, Adjustment, 
and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 404–05 (2007). 
 91. See id. at 404 n.310. 
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Whatever Dodd-Frank’s limitations on the Fed, it places no limits on 
future actions by Congress or, moreover, the executive branch. As noted 
above with respect to SIPA, the executive branch always has the option of 
claiming new powers on the grounds that an “emergency” has arisen. In 
response to emergencies both economic and military, the executive branch 
consistently requests, or simply asserts, new powers. Congress and the 
judiciary typically acquiesce or actively comply by granting requests for 
authority or ratifying new powers after the fact.92 Dodd-Frank does nothing 
to contain the executive’s option of requesting or seizing new powers, and 
does nothing to require greater independence by future Congresses or 
courts. 
Prior to OLA, the government lacked the specific authority to liquidate 
nonbank financial firms (other than in SIPA proceedings), but the 
government also took many actions in 2008 that were not expressly 
authorized under existing law. Some of these actions were defended at the 
time under the Fed’s broad emergency powers, some under the general 
authority of the President and Treasury, and some obtained ad hoc, fast-
track congressional approval. The Fed arguably exceeded its authority—
with impunity—in assisting AIG in 2008. In exchange for an $85 million 
credit line to AIG, secured by all of AIG’s assets, the Treasury obtained 
beneficial ownership of 79.9 percent of AIG stock, and the Fed gained 
certain control rights over AIG’s business.93 The Fed cited its emergency 
lending authority under 12 U.S.C. § 343 as authority to make this deal. As 
Posner and Vermeule argue, however, “the transaction was a purchase in 
substance: the Fed was given the incidents of ownership in the form of most 
of the stock. If the transaction was in substance a purchase of AIG, then it 
was not authorized by the statute, which permitted only loans.”94 There are 
of course political impediments to actions that are not expressly authorized 
by law. Vociferous political opposition, however, did not prevent the 
government’s emergency acts in 2008. In short, it is a mistake to assume 
that today’s legislation will circumscribe the government’s responses to 
tomorrow’s crises. 
OLA is likely to have a modest effect on the executive’s exercise of its 
discretion. It will probably create at least some degree of political pressure 
to consider liquidation of a troubled firm rather than a bailout. At the very 
                                                                                                                                          
 92. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1640–51 (“The upshot is that in cases of 
emergency lawmaking, Congress lets the executive have most, although not all, of what it wants. . 
. . Congress can modify and push back to a degree, but the public, motivated by some mix of fear, 
urgency, and rational apprehension, demands that something be done.”). See also Thomas W. Joo, 
Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before 
and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 22–25, 34–38 (2002) (discussing 
judicial acquiescence when the executive branch invoked threats to national security to justify the 
Japanese internment and antiterrorism legislation). 
 93. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1629. 
 94. Id. at 1630. 
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least, it sets up FDIC liquidation as the path of least resistance. But it does 
not prohibit the bailout of a failing firm. Moreover, even if the OLA route is 
chosen, the FDIC has discretion and funding options allowing it to bail out 
a failing firm’s creditors, as the following section will discuss. 
C. THE CONDUCT OF AN OLA PROCEEDING 
1. Reduced Judicial Oversight 
As noted above, a petition to invoke OLA would be subject to far less 
judicial review than a SIPC petition. OLA also provides for a significantly 
reduced judicial role during the liquidation. Like a bankruptcy, a SIPA 
liquidation occurs under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, and the 
SIPC trustee is, in most respects, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee who 
reports to the court. By contrast, the FDIC under OLA (as in its traditional 
role as a bank receiver under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)) is 
a statutory receiver that is not subject to direct court supervision. Thus, the 
statute envisions the FDIC’s discretion being cabined more by the 
administrative rulemaking process than by direct judicial review.95 
General creditor claims in a SIPC proceeding are determined by the 
bankruptcy court. For customer claims, the trustee makes the initial 
determination, but an objecting customer may file a claim with the 
bankruptcy court. An OLA liquidation, however, would be an 
administrative proceeding, not a judicial one. Neither the District Court for 
the District of Columbia (where an OLA petition must be filed) nor the 
bankruptcy court of that district would retain jurisdiction to oversee the 
process. As in an FDIC receivership, creditor claims in an OLA proceeding 
would not be filed with a court, but instead directly with the FDIC as 
receiver. The FDIC would have authority to allow or disallow all claims. 
Unlike in bankruptcy or a SIPA liquidation, OLA creditors’ objections 
would not be heard as part of an ongoing, unified judicial proceeding. 
Rather, objecting creditors would each have to file a lawsuit in the district 
court where the firm had its principal place of business.96 Filing a stand-
alone lawsuit for each objection would likely be far more cumbersome and 
expensive (for both the creditor and the court system) than filing a 
bankruptcy claim as part of a larger judicial proceeding. Since systemically 
important financial firms are likely to be multinational, multiservice firms 
                                                                                                                                          
 95. OLA empowers the SEC and the FDIC to implement the statute through joint rulemaking. 
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 209, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5389 (2010)). By the summer of 2011, the FDIC had apparently promulgated only two sets of 
rules or proposed rules under OLA: an Interim Rule, Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (proposed 
Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter FDIC Orderly Liquidation 
Authority]; and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
 96. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. 1466 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). 
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with numerous subsidiaries, lawsuits might have to be brought in multiple 
forums, burdening creditors and requiring multiple, uncoordinated courts to 
familiarize themselves with the liquidation. The “principal place of 
business” for a given claim might be an inconvenient forum for a creditor-
plaintiff; indeed, simply determining the relevant “principal place of 
business” could be a challenge and become the subject of litigation. 
Neither SIPA nor OLA authorizes the rescue of any firm subject to 
resolution. They may, however, subsidize—that is, “bail out”—certain 
creditors. SIPA, for better or worse, obviously singles out a class of 
creditors (i.e., customers) for subsidy, but at least the legislative mandate to 
do so is specifically and narrowly expressed. The reduced judicial 
discretion under OLA increases the danger that the FDIC might favor 
certain creditors, whether due to poor economic reasoning or political 
considerations. 
SIPA and the FDIC resolution of depository banks are primarily 
focused on protecting customers, and thus, they typically transfer customer 
accounts and quickly wind down or sell the failed institution. Unlike SIPC, 
however, the FDIC also has power to offer “open bank” assistance—that is, 
to help failing depository institutions avoid insolvency and resolution.97 
When numerous banks approached failure in the 1980s, the FDIC used this 
power to assist some of them, particularly larger banks considered “too big 
to fail.”98 These interventions had the highly controversial effect of bailing 
out uninsured depositors (i.e., those whose losses exceeded FDIC insurance 
limits), other unsecured creditors, and bank shareholders. 99  This led to 
stricter legislative limits on open bank powers.100 These limits, however, 
had specific exemptions for banks whose failure “would have serious 
adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”101 
OLA does not have any direct creditor subsidy analogous to SIPA’s 
customer protection. As with the FDIC’s open bank powers, however, OLA 
potentially enables the FDIC to bail out creditors at its discretion. OLA is 
specifically geared toward the broad and vague mission of protecting 
“financial stability.”102 OLA gives the FDIC broad powers to lend to the 
firm, purchase its assets or debts, assume its obligations, and guarantee new 
obligations.103 OLA also specifically authorizes the FDIC to treat similarly 
                                                                                                                                          
 97. Gordon & Muller, supra note 6, at 186. 
 98. Id. at 187–89.  
 99. Id. at 186.  
 100. Id. at 187–89.  
 101. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I) (2006). 
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situated creditors differently in order to maximize the value of the failed 
firm’s assets or “to initiate and continue operations essential to 
implementation of the receivership or any bridge financial company.”104 
There is no explicit provision for judicial review of such decisions; 105 
rather, discretion is to be governed by agency rulemaking.106 
OLA also empowers the FDIC to establish and fund “bridge financial 
companies” to assume a firm’s liabilities or purchase its assets or “perform 
any other temporary function which the [FDIC] may, in its discretion, 
prescribe.”107 A bridge company would assume the rights and powers of the 
failed company without judicial approval108 and could exist for up to five 
years.109 The FDIC could provide operating funds to these companies or 
authorize them to issue capital stock or other securities.110 The FDIC has 
similar authority to establish a “bridge bank” in the bank receivership 
context. SIPA, however, does not give SIPC or its trustees explicit authority 
to create bridge firms. 111  The FDIC’s discretion to assign “temporary 
functions” to a bridge company would presumably allow it to continue 
some of the firm’s business operations on the grounds that doing so would 
maximize the value of the estate. The FDIC would decide what assets and 
liabilities to transfer to the bridge company without judicial approval.112 In 
deciding what assets to transfer, the FDIC is expressly authorized to treat 
similarly situated creditors differently in order to maximize asset value.113 
Furthermore, although it lacks the direct subsidy of customer-creditors 
found in SIPA or the FDIA, OLA does explicitly favor a certain type of 
creditor. While an OLA proceeding stays most other actions against the 
failed firm, it does not stay counterparties from exercising their rights under 
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“qualified financial contracts.” 114  OLA defines “qualified financial 
contract” (QFC) to include any contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of 
securities, “commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, 
[or] swap agreement.”115 OLA further authorizes the FDIC to pass rules 
extending the exemption to other “similar agreement[s].”116 
The QFC exemption appears in other U.S. insolvency regimes as well. 
QFCs were first exempted from the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,117 and that 
exemption is incorporated into SIPA.118 The OLA exemption is apparently 
copied from a nearly identical provision in the FDIA. 119  The QFC 
exemption is explained on the ground that it mitigates the spillover effects 
of a failure.120  In the FDIA context, the FDIC has justified the special 
treatment of QFCs on the ground that they facilitate “appropriate liquidity 
and hedging operations in financial institutions” and are “conducted in a 
highly regulated industry providing further safeguards.”121 The automatic 
stay in the resolution of a bank or financial firm could create extensive 
losses to QFC counterparties as market values decline, or so the argument 
goes.122 But, of course, the automatic stay potentially imposes losses on 
every kind of creditor to which it applies. 
Any benefits of the exemption may be outweighed by its potential 
harms. Indeed, exempting QFCs from a stay during any insolvency 
proceedings—under OLA, SIPA, the FDIA, or bankruptcy—has been 
criticized as an invitation to a “run” by QFC counterparties that could 
exacerbate financial distress rather than alleviate it.123 Harvey Miller, the 
lawyer heading Lehman’s bankruptcy, has testified before Congress that the 
QFC exemption resulted in a “massive destruction of value.”124 Like many 
exemptions to the automatic stay, the special treatment of QFCs seems to be 
the product of successful special interest lobbying rather than good 
policy.125 
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OLA attempts a compromise by delaying the exemption until the end of 
the first business day after the filing. OLA in effect imposes a one-day stay 
on QFCs that does not apply in a bankruptcy or SIPA proceeding.126 Like 
the QFC exemption itself, this provision is borrowed directly from the 
FDIA’s bank-resolution scheme.127 In theory, the FDIC would use this time 
to transfer some of the failed firm’s contracts to solvent firms or to new 
bridge companies.128 But even assuming one day is sufficient to transfer 
QFCs in the routine bank-resolution context, a massive, “systemically 
important” financial institution would have innumerable and highly 
complex QFCs. The failure would probably take place in a highly volatile, 
if not panicked, market, making valuing the contracts and finding 
transferees even more difficult. Thus in the OLA context, a one-day stay 
would probably be insufficient to facilitate significant transfers of QFCs or 
to prevent a run by counterparties after the first day had passed. 
2. OLA and SIPA Interaction 
If a financial company being liquidated under OLA were a SIPC 
member, OLA seems to envision that some portion of its business would be 
liquidated according to SIPA under the auspices of SIPC.129 This is not to 
say that brokerage accounts would be cleanly severed and administered 
under SIPA. Most financial firms fit the broad definitions of “broker” or 
“dealer”130 and are thus likely to be SIPC members. But OLA gives little 
guidance as to which assets and liabilities of such firms would be part of the 
SIPA estate and which would be administered under OLA. OLA seems to 
give the FDIC considerable discretion with respect to this issue. If 
appointed receiver of a covered broker-dealer, the FDIC “shall” appoint 
SIPC as receiver,131 but SIPA shall apply to—and only to—those claims 
and assets that the FDIC does not transfer to a bridge financial company.132 
As noted above, the FDIC has broad authority to determine which assets 
and liabilities will be transferred. 
OLA seems to envision the transfer of customer accounts to a solvent 
SIPC member firm; SIPC trustees typically do this promptly upon being 
appointed. Customers thus regain access to their accounts, and may file 
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customer claims in the SIPC proceeding for any shortfall in the contents of 
their accounts. In an OLA proceeding, however, it may be difficult to 
transfer the myriad accounts of a failed megafirm, particularly in a time of 
systemic distress. If customer accounts are not transferred to a new 
brokerage, and the FDIC has established any bridge companies, OLA 
requires the FDIC to transfer all customer accounts to one of those bridge 
companies.133 
As noted above, the fundamental characteristic of SIPA is its 
requirement that the fund of customer property be preserved and applied in 
the first instance toward satisfying customer claims. OLA does not seem to 
impose the same requirement. The transfer rules described above do not 
seem to require that customer accounts be transferred to a new brokerage. 
Rather, the statute states that if they are not transferred to a new brokerage, 
they must be transferred to a bridge company unless doing so “would 
materially interfere with the ability of the Corporation to avoid or mitigate 
serious adverse effects on financial stability or economic conditions in the 
United States.”134 The transfer of customer accounts does not require court 
approval or customer assent.135 On its face, all this seems to suggest that if a 
new brokerage home for customer accounts is available, the FDIC will have 
some discretion as to whether to transfer customer accounts to the new 
brokerage or transfer them to a bridge company. The statute’s intent to give 
the FDIC this discretion is further evidenced by its express statement that 
the FDIC’s power to transfer assets to a bridge company is not limited in 
any way by SIPA (despite SIPA’s focus on reserving the fund of customer 
property to satisfy customer claims).136 
OLA does contain a general proviso that the FDIC may not operate 
bridge companies in such a way as to “adversely affect the ability of 
customers to promptly access their customer property.”137  It is unclear, 
however, whether this provision means the FDIC must transfer accounts 
and make other efforts to make accounts accessible (as SIPC does), or 
whether it simply means the FDIC should not deliberately obstruct access to 
accounts. In any event, this provision would be extremely difficult to 
enforce, as it would surely be reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard normally applied to agency action. 
If customer accounts were transferred to a bridge company, they would 
remain part of the FDIC’s OLA receivership and not part of a SIPA 
proceeding. 138  OLA, however, requires the FDIC as receiver to give 
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customers securities or payments in the same amounts they would have 
received in a SIPA liquidation.139 It would seem to follow that, in the event 
of a shortfall in the fund of customer property, the SIPC Fund would pay 
for claims handled by SIPC, and OLA’s Orderly Liquidation Fund140 would 
cover claims handled by the FDIC. OLA is unclear on this issue, as it both 
directs SIPA to “satisfy customer claims . . . as if the appointment of the 
[FDIC] as receiver had not occurred,” and directs the FDIC to satisfy 
customer claims in the amount that the customer would have received had 
the firm “been subject to a proceeding under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act.”141 
In any case, there seems to be little reason why the FDIC would retain 
customer accounts rather than leave them to a SIPA proceeding. A more 
likely consequence of the OLA-SIPA overlap would be competition 
between the FDIC and SIPC over the resources of the failed firm. The 
FDIC could, for example, leave all or most of the fund of customer property 
subject to the SIPA proceeding, but transfer all or most of the general estate 
to a bridge company. This would relieve burdens on the FDIC’s funding 
sources (discussed in the following section) by transferring them to SIPC. 
The lack of a general estate would deprive the SIPA liquidation of its 
primary source of administrative funding and thus require drawdowns from 
the SIPC Fund. Depletion of the SIPC Fund could require SIPC to borrow 
from the Treasury and/or increase its assessments on its member firms. 
D. OLA FUNDING 
The most obvious distinctions between SIPA and OLA are the SIPC 
Fund and SIPC insurance, which have no counterparts in OLA. As noted 
above, SIPA has a member-financed fund that is available for 
administrative costs and to insure a narrowly defined set of creditor claims. 
By contrast, OLA does not provide for insurance, nor does it impose regular 
assessments or establish prefunding of any kind. An earlier version of 
Dodd-Frank would have imposed SIPC-like assessments to create a fund to 
                                                                                                                                          
 139. Id. § 205(f)(1). Note, however, that a customer seeking to enforce this provision would 
have to file a suit in the district court for the district where the firm’s “principal place of business” 
was located. See id. §§ 205(e), 210(a)(4). 
 140. The “Orderly Liquidation Fund” is the funding source for OLA proceedings. See infra text 
accompanying Part II.D. 
 141. Dodd-Frank Act § 205(f)(2), 124 Stat. 1458 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5385). 
2011] A Comparison of Liquidation Regimes 71 
pay for liquidations,142 but this scheme was rejected after politicians and 
commentators vilified it as a “bank tax.”143 
OLA nominally establishes an “Orderly Liquidation Fund” as a 
“separate fund” within the Treasury.144 This so-called “Fund,” however, is 
merely a grant of authority to the FDIC to borrow unlimited amounts from 
the Treasury.145 The FDIC, after submitting an “Orderly Liquidation Plan” 
to the Treasury Secretary, can borrow money from the Treasury to cover the 
costs of liquidation.146 The FDIC’s costs are the highest-priority unsecured 
claims against the firm.147 If the firm’s assets prove insufficient to cover the 
amounts borrowed from the Treasury, the FDIC may impose post-hoc, risk-
based assessments on financial firms.148 
A typical insurance pool would use an insured’s risk of failure to 
determine the amount it pays toward the costs of future potential failures 
(which of course might include its own). OLA, however, envisions a post-
hoc assessment scheme that would use an insured’s current risk of failure to 
determine the amount it pays toward the costs of the past failures of other 
firms. Having been increased recently to make up for the Madoff payouts, 
SIPC assessments can be said to have a partially post-hoc character. 
This post-hoc approach certainly seems less than ideal at first glance. 
Most obviously, the cost is imposed not on failed firms, but on their 
surviving competitors—presumably, the least risky firms. Furthermore, 
firms cannot anticipate or budget for post-hoc assessments, and the ability 
to recoup costs after the fact reduces an agency’s incentive to contain costs. 
Finally, while assessments nominally impose costs on the relevant industry, 
the industry can simply pass them on to its customers. The Madoff 
experience, however, arguably provides some pragmatic justification for a 
post-hoc approach. The amount of funding required to deal with massive, 
system-threatening failures simply cannot be known in advance, and it 
seems potentially wasteful to collect huge amounts in advance without 
knowing whether they will ever be used. The power to impose or increase 
assessments to pay for major failures ex post insures that the cost falls on 
the industry and protects the public fisc. Moreover, to the extent that an 
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OLA proceeding is meant to preserve the financial system, surviving 
financial firms are indeed its main beneficiaries. Thus, there may be 
something to be said for the post-hoc approach, although it does nothing to 
reduce or disincentivize the risky behavior that may lead to failure. 
Yet, it may not be feasible to implement the assessment scheme OLA 
envisions. Unlike OLA’s post-hoc assessments, SIPC’s post-Madoff 
assessments were based on firm size and not on risk. While basing 
assessments on a firm’s risk profile would in theory enhance both fairness 
and efficiency, implementing a risk-based system is easier said than done. 
As noted above, SIPC has never used its statutory power to impose risk- 
based assessments; its current chairman argues that doing so would be 
prohibitively difficult and costly.149 In the more complex and unfamiliar 
context envisioned by OLA, these obstacles would be even greater. 
The cost of liquidations can be immense and difficult to contain. A 
recent report by the SEC Office of Inspector General argued that SIPC 
administrative fees lack regulatory oversight and review.150 As of March 
2011, the costs of administering the Madoff SIPA liquidation had surpassed 
$100 million. The costs of the SIPA liquidation of Lehman had reached 
$420 million. 151  The SEC noted that both liquidations were far from 
finished and that further costs could threaten the $2.5 billion SIPC Fund and 
potentially require loans from the Treasury. 152  Note that these figures 
pertain only to SIPA proceedings; they do not include the costs of 
Lehman’s much larger Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
OLA only applies to firms so large and/or complex that their failures 
would pose “systemic risk.”153 The liquidation of such a firm would be 
accordingly large and complex, and thus extremely costly. Note that the 
costs of an OLA proceeding would not be limited to purely incidental 
administrative costs. They could also include providing a financial 
megafirm with operating capital. Although the firm must ultimately be 
wound down, the FDIC has broad powers to finance loans to the firm, 
purchase its assets or debts, assume its obligations, and guarantee new 
obligations, as well as to establish and fund bridge financial companies.154 
Thus, as Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller point out, the FDIC’s 
ability to borrow money to fund a liquidation in effect guarantees a source 
of DIP financing during the wind-down, which could include the continued 
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operation of its business via bridge companies for a period of years.155 In a 
bankruptcy, the market, not a statute, would determine whether such 
financing became available, and a court would supervise how it was used. 
This is not to say that government-subsidized DIP financing is a 
complete departure from past practice. Recall that in 2008 the Fed provided 
loans on favorable terms to help finance Lehman’s bankruptcy proceedings. 
But in any event, OLA’s codification of government power to finance 
wind-downs—which could in effect subsidize certain creditors—
demonstrates that OLA’s anti-bailout rhetoric is overstated. Such subsidies 
may not always be unjustified, but OLA buries them in the liquidation 
process and thus reduces political and judicial oversight. 
E. INSURANCE 
Gordon and Muller have proposed supplementing OLA with an 
insurance component—that financial companies should pay risk-based 
assessments to create a $1 trillion fund to protect creditors.156 Shortfalls in 
the fund could be supplemented with borrowing from the Treasury, to be 
repaid with post-hoc assessments on surviving firms, as they would be 
under OLA.157 As with SIPA, insurance could raise the specter of moral 
hazard. As argued above, certain creditors, especially those considered “too 
big to fail,” may expect to be bailed out in order to preserve stability. 
However, the risks that such a fund seeks to mitigate—destabilizing chain 
reactions throughout the financial system—are significantly greater than 
those that SIPA seeks to mitigate: small investors’ unwillingness to use 
broker-dealers. In Gordon and Muller’s words, “it is a prudential measure 
against possibilities we may not project, notwithstanding efforts to avoid 
them.”158 Furthermore, the moral hazard typically associated with insurance 
is significantly reduced because, as argued above, it is simply unclear 
whether and in what circumstances OLA would be invoked and which 
creditors would benefit. Most importantly, an OLA proceeding could 
potentially bail out creditors;159 thus industry-paid prefunding and insurance 
would be more fair (as well as more predictable and fiscally prudent) than 
OLA’s system of paying costs via open-ended borrowing and post-hoc 
assessments. 
As Gordon and Muller point out, a lack of prefunding may make 
regulators hesitant to intervene even when necessary.160  But prefunding 
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may create the opposite problem—an excessive readiness to intervene. One 
commentator, formerly FDIC’s general counsel, has argued that the FDIC 
(in its traditional role as bank regulator) has historically been too quick to 
determine that receivership is necessary to avert “systemic” consequences, 
and that the creation of a fund for OLA would exacerbate that tendency.161 
Whatever the policy justifications, a prefunding scheme is unlikely to 
survive political objections, and the securities industry is unlikely to support 
it. Similarly, risk-based assessments are likely to be too costly and difficult 
to administer; they are also likely to be challenged by the industry. As 
further noted above, an earlier proposal for assessments was assailed as a 
“bank tax” (notwithstanding the fact that the proceeds would have benefited 
the banks). The proposed fund was criticized by others as a “bailout” fund 
(notwithstanding the fact that it would have obviated the use of public funds 
to finance liquidations). The insurance fund would make transparent the 
purpose of protecting creditors. This may be preferable to OLA’s potential 
for disguising creditor subsidies in the liquidation process, but would make 
the proposal politically unpalatable. Furthermore, as Gordon and Muller 
acknowledge, the fund would require authority to borrow from the Treasury 
as a backstop, a feature that seems unlikely to survive political 
opposition.162 
CONCLUSION 
As noted above, Congress passed SIPA in order to increase investor 
confidence and shore up the depressed securities market in the wake of the 
back-office crisis and subsequent market slump. Whatever the merits of 
protecting customers, it could be argued that the loss of investor confidence 
was justified by market conditions, such that SIPA’s larger goal was 
misconceived. 163  Unfortunately, OLA also has confused goals and does 
little to prevent failure. Like SIPA, OLA is mainly concerned with 
mitigating the consequences of failure. Whether it is even suited to meet 
that goal has been questioned: it has been argued that its firm-by-firm 
liquidation approach is suited to isolated failures but inappropriate for 
addressing a systemic crisis.164 
OLA was precipitated by anti-bailout sentiment and purports to be an 
anti-bailout measure. But despite this rhetoric, OLA does little, if anything, 
to prevent bailouts in the future. OLA’s stated purposes include “improving 
accountability” and “ending too big to fail.” Forcing the liquidation of 
insolvent financial firms would arguably hold them “accountable” for their 
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failures (whether that would enhance stability, however, is of course 
debatable). But as discussed above, OLA only specifies a procedure for 
liquidation; it does not require it. The open-ended resolution process creates 
opportunities for creditor bailouts—the antithesis of “improving 
accountability.” While OLA does not authorize bailouts—whether for “too 
big to fail” reasons or other grounds—it does nothing to prevent them 
either. As Roberta Karmel points out in her contribution to this Symposium, 
the largest surviving financial firms are even larger now than they were in 
2008, having purchased the assets of failed firms and taken over their 
market share, sometimes with the direct assistance of the government.165 
The liquidation of a megafirm under OLA would repeat this process: only 
the surviving megafirms would have sufficient capital to purchase the assets 
of the failed firm. That is, concentration would only increase further. Dodd-
Frank establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to look 
into such issues,166 but it remains to be seen whether the FSOC will have 
any effect on the concentration of financial power. 
The FDIC’s broad discretion under OLA to pursue the vague goal of 
“financial stability” creates the danger that the FDIC could bail out certain 
favored creditors at the expense of other unsecured creditors and taxpayers. 
Although the government always has the option to bail out favored 
creditors, the resolution process might make such actions politically easier 
by providing layers of cover.167 For this reason, some commentators have 
argued that the resolution of major financial firms should assign a greater 
role to bankruptcy courts and less discretion to government agencies.168 
Some commentators have argued that excluding financial companies 
from bankruptcy is unnecessary. 169 Statutory resolution regimes are often 
justified as exceptions to bankruptcy on the ground that regulatory agencies 
have specialized industry expertise that generalized bankruptcy judges lack. 
SIPC, for example, deals exclusively with broker failures, has a highly 
specialized and experienced staff, and appoints trustees with experience in 
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the area. Analogously, the FDIC has expertise in the resolution of banks. 
Bankruptcy-based alternative proposals address the expertise issue through 
such devices as special masters and agency participation (including agency 
power to file involuntary petitions).170 It is unclear, however, whether the 
FDIC, or, to be fair, any agency, has the skill and resources to handle the 
kind of massive liquidation contemplated by OLA. 
The exclusion of brokerage firms from Chapter 11, David Skeel has 
argued, may have been appropriate in the 1960s, when firms were typically 
general partnerships that primarily provided brokerage services, but not 
today. 171  Today’s firms are typically large corporations (often publicly-
traded) with complex capital structures, multiple related entities, and 
significant proprietary trading activity.172 As noted above, the two largest 
brokerage failures in history, Drexel and Lehman, were resolved primarily 
under Chapter 11, despite SIPA and the nominal exception of brokerages 
from Chapter 11. 
Some believe that the destructive effects of Lehman’s failure could 
have been mitigated if the government had had clear authority and 
procedures by which to wind it up. 173  The panic caused by Lehman’s 
“disorderly” descent into bankruptcy is often cited as a justification for 
OLA, but this argument makes little sense. Indeed, the Lehman experience 
seems to demonstrate the power and adaptability of bankruptcy, not its 
shortcomings. Lehman’s failure caused panic because the market expected a 
bailout, particularly after the Fed engineered the sale of Bear Stearns to 
JPMorgan. That is, the panic was caused not by Lehman’s Chapter 11 filing 
per se, but by the absence of a government rescue.174 
I do not mean to advocate for bailouts, but rather to say that nothing 
about Lehman (or the rest of the financial crisis) clearly justifies yet another 
exception to bankruptcy. The Lehman bankruptcy seems to have proceeded 
relatively smoothly so far. Indeed, once Lehman was “allowed” to fail, its 
customer accounts and other good assets were quickly transferred using a 
combination of Chapter 11 for the holding company and SIPA for the 
Lehman Brothers, Inc., brokerage subsidiary. 175  As described above, 
lawyers, SIPC, and the bankruptcy court had to engage in some 
questionable sleight of hand to evade the exclusion of brokerages from 
Chapter 11.176 As Skeel argues, this episode illustrates the pointlessness of 
the Chapter 11 exclusion and suggests that the bankruptcy process is indeed 
up to the task of handling massive financial failures. 
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During and after the congressional debates that led to Dodd-Frank and 
OLA, a number of prominent commentators argued in favor of a modified 
Chapter 11 proceeding that would incorporate agency expertise but take 
place under the supervision of a bankruptcy court.177 Indeed, a bill was 
introduced in the House that would have added a new Chapter 14 to the 
Bankruptcy Code to deal with financial institutions.178 Congress, however, 
rejected court-centered bankruptcy in favor of OLA’s agency-led resolution 
regime. This expansion of executive power is startling in light of the 
criticism leveled at the Treasury, the Fed, and the White House for their 
handling of the crisis. It is, however, consistent with Congress’ historical 
tendency to respond to emergencies by delegating increased power and 
discretion to the executive branch. 
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